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Pakistan
Abstract
Network shutdowns impacting an entire country are now almost non-existent, but the practice of shutting
down communications in certain cities or areas of a country, or suspending certain services continues
globally. This has happened over the past decade or so for a variety of reasons, sometimes due to
national security concerns but also to prevent the organisation of protests or the spread of civil unrest.
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the subject, most telecommunications operators rarely address
publicly the issue of network shutdowns and associated policies. Therefore, relatively little is known
about the reasons for shutdowns, the mechanism through which governments affect such shutdowns, or
the economic and social impacts of shutdowns on telecommunications companies, users, and society at
large. Without such information, there is little opportunity to understand the avenues for prevention,
mitigation and redress for business, users, or civil society.
To combat its own serious public security challenges, the Government of Pakistan has often instructed
telecommunication operators to suspend mobile and/or Internet networks where intelligence indicates a
threat to national security. The Government of Pakistan’s stated intention in blocking access to
communication at such a time is primarily in order to protect the right to life as violent extremists use
mobile phones to inform each other of their movements and in some cases, mobile phones have been
used to detonate bombs.
Due to the relatively frequent nature of network shutdowns and associated security considerations,
Pakistan was selected as the focus for this study. This paper seeks to:

• Analyse the Pakistan context as an introduction to further research on the economic and
social impacts of network shutdowns.
• Explore how requests for disconnection are made by authorised agencies to
telecommunication operators.
• Conduct a preliminary study on the day-to-day impacts and the perception of Pakistani
citizens of network shutdowns, with a view to developing more in-depth research in the
future.
• Analyse instances of mobile and Internet shutdowns outside of Pakistan, which were
followed by corporate and government campaigns to achieve positive change, such as an
amendment in the law.
• Provide best practices and guidelines for telecommunication operators with regard to
handling network shutdown requests.
• Explore short-term and long-term opportunities for government strategies that both
safeguard human rights online and offline by working with companies and governments
so that human rights (of expression, assembly, privacy, security, and others) are not
undermined while governments pursue legitimate objectives such as protecting society
from terrorism or violence.
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About IHRB
The Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB) is a global centre of excellence and expertise (a
think & do tank) on the relationship between business and internationally proclaimed human rights
standards. We work to shape policy, advance practice and strengthen accountability to ensure the
activities of companies do not contribute to human rights abuses, and in fact lead to positive outcomes.
IHRB prioritises its work through time-bound programmes that can have the greatest impact, leverage
and catalytic effect focusing on countries in economic and political transition, as well as business
sectors that underpin others in relation to the flows of information, finance, workers and commodities.
www.ihrb.org
About Digital Dangers
“Digital Dangers: Identifying and Mitigating Threats in the Digital Realm” is a project developed
by IHRB in collaboration with the School of Law at the University of Washington in Seattle. The project
builds on IHRB’s involvement in the European Commission ICT Sector Guide on Implementing the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights1. Digital Dangers identifies a number of areas
including security, safety, free assembly, free expression and privacy where ICT companies and other
actors would benefit from in-depth human rights analysis and policy oriented recommendations.
One of the aims of the Digital Dangers project is to encourage companies to be open and transparent
about the complex dilemmas they face in respecting freedom of expression and privacy by sharing their
experiences to spark debate with governments and civil society and bring about positive change.
The Digital Dangers methodology is unique. Once a specific topic and company have been selected as
the subject of a Digital Dangers case study, an IHRB researcher is “embedded” into company operations,
with permission, for a short period of time to observe dilemmas and complexities first hand. The company
that is subject of the case study is able to review IHRB’s report before publication, but IHRB is solely
responsible for the content of the case study. IHRB does not accept funding from companies for these
case studies; their value lies in their independence and impartiality.
The first case study in the Digital Dangers series addressed corporate responses to hate speech in
the 2013 Kenya Presidential elections, focusing on the experiences of the Kenyan telecoms operator
Safaricom2. The second explored human rights challenges for network vendors and the misuse of
telecommunications systems, focusing on the experience of the Swedish vendor Ericsson3.
www.digitaldangers.org
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About this Paper
The role of telecommunications operators in network shutdowns first captured global
attention following events in Egypt during the 2011 Arab Spring, when former President
Hosni Mubarak ordered a near country-wide shutdown of mobile and Internet services,
reportedly with the aim of preventing anti-government protesters from utilising these
tools to organise and spread their message4.
Network shutdowns impacting an entire country are now almost non-existent, but
the practice of shutting down communications in certain cities or areas of a country,
or suspending certain services continues globally. This has happened over the past
decade or so for a variety of reasons, sometimes due to national security concerns but
also to prevent the organisation of protests or the spread of civil unrest.
Other high profile cases of network shutdowns over the past decade include in India5,
China6, the United Kingdom7 and the United States8. In 2013 and 2014 alone,
Freedom House reported network shutdowns that were likely government-ordered in
Ethiopia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe9.
In January 2015, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo ordered a
reportedly near country-wide mobile Internet and SMS shutdown following protests
4
Matt Richel, New York Times, Egypt Cuts Off Most Internet and Cellphone Service
(28 Jan 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/technology/internet/29cutoff.html
Jim Cowie, Dyn Research, Egypt Leaves the Internet (27 January 2011)
http://research.dyn.com/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet
5
On March 17th and 18th 2014, the government of India shutdown parts of the Internet in
Kashmir, reportedly to prevent Kashmiri leaders from addressing a UN Human Rights Council side event
in Geneva via video link. See: Kashmir Media Service, India shuts down internet to prevent Mirwaiz’s
address (18 March 2014) http://www.kmsnews.org/news/2014/03/18/india-shuts-down-internet-toprevent-mirwaizs-address.html
In September 2014, mobile data and SMS were suspended in Vadodara, Gujarat following civil
unrest. See: Mahesh Langa and M Rajendran, Hindustan Times, Vadodara tense, mobile data services
suspended, (28 September 2014) http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/communal-unrest-invadodara-internet-banned/article1-1269051.aspx
In March 2015, Internet and SMS services were blocked in Kohima, Nagland, following the
distribution of a video reportedly showing the lynching of a man accused of rape. See: Zee News, Mobile
Internet facility suspended in violence-hit Vadodara (28 September 2014) http://zeenews.india.com/
news/gujarat/mobile-internet-facility-suspended-in-violence-hit-vadodara_1476963.html
6
Following riots in the Xinjiang region, Internet access was shutdown for 10 months, affecting
a reported 7 million people. See: Chris Hogg, BBC News Online, China Restores Xinjiang Internet (14
May 2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8682145.stm
7
BBC News Online, 7 July Phone Shutdown Criticised (1 March 2006)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/4763350.stm
8
Melissa Bell, The Washington Post, BART San Francisco Cuts Cell Services to Avert Protests (12
August 2011) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/post/bart-san-francisco-cut-cellservices-to-avert-protest/2011/08/12/gIQAfLCgBJ_blog.html
9
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2014
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf
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over the President’s unconstitutional decision to remain in power for a third term10.
In May 2015 in Burundi, following similar protests over the President’s plan to seek
another term in office, the government blocked access to social networking sites
Facebook and Twitter, and messaging applications Viber and Whatsapp11.
A timeline of network shutdowns created by the Centre For Democracy and Technology
(CDT) indicates that shutdowns increased globally year on year from 2005 to 201412.
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the subject, most telecommunications
operators rarely address publicly the issue of network shutdowns and associated
policies. Therefore, relatively little is known about the reasons for shutdowns, the
mechanism through which governments affect such shutdowns, or the economic and
social impacts of shutdowns on telecommunications companies, users, and society at
large. Without such information, there is little opportunity to understand the avenues
for prevention, mitigation and redress for business, users, or civil society.
To combat its own serious public security challenges, the Government of Pakistan
has often instructed telecommunication operators to suspend mobile and/or Internet
networks where intelligence indicates a threat to national security. The Government
of Pakistan’s stated intention in blocking access to communication at such a time is
primarily in order to protect the right to life13 as violent extremists use mobile phones
to inform each other of their movements and in some cases, mobile phones have been
used to detonate bombs.14
Companies in most jurisdictions have a legal obligation to comply with and support
the State’s efforts where there is an imminent threat of violence. However, many
experts argue that network shutdowns violate a range of human rights, and are neither
necessary nor proportionate responses to potential violent activities. While the debate
is often framed around the resulting restrictions to freedom of expression, network
shutdowns also impact other rights, including life, access to health services, education,
and work.
Due to the relatively frequent nature of network shutdowns and associated security
10
Lucy Purdon, IHRB, Network Shutdowns in the DRC: ICT Companies Need Clear Rules (19
February 2015) http://www.IHRB.org/commentary/network-shutdowns-the-drc-ict-companies.html
Vincent Matinde, ITWebAfrica, Burundi Shuts Down Internet Access (30 April 2015)
11
http://www.itwebafrica.com/ict-and-governance/363-burundi/234560-burundi-shuts-downinternet-access
http://network-shutdowns.cdt.info/timeline.php
12
The right to life has been defined in a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan- PLD 1994
13
SC 693, “Article 9 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save
in accordance with law. The word “life” is very significant as it covers all facts of human existence.
The word “life” has not been defined in the Constitution but it does not mean nor can be restricted
only to the vegetative or animal life or mere existence from conception to death. Life includes all such
amenities and facilities which a person born in a free country is entitled to enjoy with dignity, legally
and constitutionally.” See http://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/pld-1994-sc-693/
Associated Press, Bomb at Pakistan Shiite Procession Kills 7 (24 November 2012)
14
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bomb-at-pakistan-shiite-procession-kills-7/
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considerations, Pakistan was selected as the focus for this study. At the start of the
project, IHRB posed the following research questions to apply to the context of Pakistan:
•

Why does the Government make shutdown requests?15

•

How are shutdown requests made to operators?

•

What is the legal basis for a shutdown?

•

How do shutdowns impact people’s day-to-day lives?

Posing these questions at the start of this process demonstrated how little information
exists in the public domain regarding shutdowns and the need for further research
and discussion. This paper examines one particular network shutdown in the Pakistani
capital Islamabad and in the city of Rawalpindi during March 2015. The aim is to:
•

Analyse the Pakistan context as an introduction to further research on the 		
economic and social impacts of network shutdowns.

•

Explore how requests for disconnection are made by authorised agencies to 		
telecommunication operators.

•

Conduct a preliminary study on the day-to-day impacts and the perception
of Pakistani citizens of network shutdowns, with a view to developing more
in-depth research in the future. This study did not look into the full economic
impact of a shutdown.

•

Analyse instances of mobile and Internet shutdowns outside of Pakistan,
which were followed by corporate and government campaigns to achieve
positive change, such as an amendment in the law.

•

Provide best practices and guidelines for telecommunication operators with
regard to handling network shutdown requests.

•

Explore short-term and long-term opportunities for government strategies
that both safeguard human rights online and offline by working with
companies and governments so that human rights (of 			
expression, assembly, privacy, security, and others) are not undermined while
governments pursue legitimate objectives such as protecting society from
terrorism or violence.

15
For the purposes of this paper, shutdowns are defined as suspension of entire mobile or Internet services, rather than access to a particular website (e.g. a social networking site) or part of a mobile
network (e.g. SMS) unless otherwise specified.
3

Methodology
An IHRB researcher spent three days at Telenor Pakistan’s headquarters in Islamabad,
Pakistan, to conduct research into the context of network disconnections and document
how Telenor Pakistan receives and acts on requests from the Government to initiate
network shutdowns. Telenor Pakistan co-operated with IHRB’s request to visit company
headquarters and made its staff available for interviews. Each department interviewed
detailed its part in the process of implementing a network shutdown request. This study
also compiles desk research on other network shutdowns, and draws on IHRB’s previous
research in this area. IHRB shared a draft of this report with Telenor Pakistan before
publication in order to identify any proprietary information or information of commercial
significance that should remain confidential, as well as to ensure accuracy.
IHRB partnered with the Islamabad based digital rights organisation Bytes for All16 and
the Centre for Internet and Human Rights (CIHR)17 in Berlin to conduct on the ground
research into the impacts of network shutdowns in Pakistan. Bytes for All and CIHR
developed a survey, which aimed to ascertain how people perceive shutdowns and how
shutdowns impacted day-to-day life, work and study. The survey was tested with members
of the public during the network shutdown over Ashura18 in November 2014, which was
also available online19. It was then revised and used during the network shutdown in
Islamabad on 23 March 2015. The survey data collected during the latter shutdown
features in this paper.
IHRB, Bytes for All and CIHR did not have official advance notice the shutdown would
take place. However, researchers were able to identify patterns in shutdowns taking
place around national and religious holidays as well as other key political events, which
made it easier to anticipate when shutdowns would take place. Bytes for All also received
information that a request had been issued by Pakistan’s telecommunication regulator,
the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), on 11 March 2015. Once it became
clear on the morning of 23 March that a shutdown was indeed in progress, Bytes for
All researchers completed 190 surveys with members of the public in Islamabad and
Rawalpindi on that day and in the following week after the shutdown.
Rapidly responding and collecting data under these circumstances is very challenging.
Although readers should take note of the limited scope of this survey (featured in Section
6 and referenced throughout the study), the survey presents an important step in an
exploratory study of the actual disconnection of communications networks and the
consequences of such actions. The results of these surveys served as a catalyst for further
research into identified impacts, as well as recommendations to mitigate the impacts on
fundamental rights and scope for further in-depth research.20
16
http://content.bytesforall.pk
https://cihr.eu
17
Ashura is a religious day for Muslims on the tenth day of Muharram, which is the first month
18
of the Islamic calendar. Shia Muslims consider it a day of mourning and Shia Muslims in South Asia
perform ritual processions and marches on this day.
https://content.bytesforall.pk/disconnectionofcommunicationservices
19
IHRB presented some initial findings in May 2015 at Telenor’s 2015 Sustainability Seminar in
20
London, and took part in a panel discussion on the issue. See video here:
http://www.Telenor.com/investors/presentations/2015/Telenor-group-sustainability-seminar/
4

Executive Summary
Most countries’ national laws allow governments to take control of communications
networks during a national emergency, but the situations in which governments can
exercise this power are often not clearly indicated21. Governments cite a number of
different reasons for ordering a network shutdown: For perceived safety of citizens
citing harms that might follow if (for example) a bomb is detonated by a mobile
phone; to deal with civil unrest; to prevent information leaving the country; or to
prevent further mobilisation of protests against a government.
Telecommunication operators often bear the responsibility of executing government
orders to shutdown communications, whether mobile networks in particular cities or
regions, Internet access, or access to particular websites or messaging applications. The
request process may be unclear, execution is technically complex, and there is in most
cases virtually no transparency. In addition, it is still a difficult topic for companies to
discuss publicly, due to the national security element.
The primary duty of any government is to protect the safety and security of its citizens.
But states have broader obligations to protect the whole spectrum of human rights.
Such suspension or disconnection of services is likely to adversely impact on freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly and a range of other economic and social rights.
As more and more people become connected to and rely on mobile and Internet
services, and telecommunications become an indispensable cornerstone of the
economy, government-ordered network shutdowns become increasingly disruptive,
even endangering the right to life which the government is likely trying to protect.
Pakistan’s political trajectory has been unstable for much of the past two decades;
however, in the past seven years, a democratic government has completed its tenure
and there has been peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another.
At the same time, the country has continued to suffer frequent terrorist attacks. The
Government’s security concerns are valid and it has an obligation to take all reasonable
steps to protect civilian lives. However, experts are concerned that network shutdowns
are becoming the norm, rather than an exception, and are being utilised as the main
strategy to curb terrorism, when instead, improving other methods of investigation is
required22.
Telecommunication operators doing business in Pakistan are operating in difficult
circumstances, and need to balance their goal of providing seamless services to their
customers with the needs of security agencies seeking effective steps to prevent acts
of terror within their territory.
Network shutdowns began in Pakistan around 2005 during violence in the Balochistan
21
For example, see Article 34 and 35 of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
Constitution http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/09/S02090000115201PDFE.PDF
For example, counter intelligence, forensic investigation, witness protection, additional
22
training for local police forces.
5

region. Today, shutdowns usually occur over religious and national holidays, or during
mass protests and political rallies. Annex A lists all known instances of shutdowns from
2012- 2015. Network shutdowns in Pakistan usually means the complete shutdown of
cellular services, including voice, short message service (SMS), and mobile Internet.
Fixed line Internet and telephone access can also be limited at times.
It is acknowledged that mobile network shutdowns have become less frequent in recent
years and far more targeted in scope. This could be in part due to the introduction of
a more streamlined request process that took effect from 2012, which is outlined in
the body of this paper.
However, the trend of blocking communication services for security reasons may be set
to increase in scope to include Wi-Fi networks. This expansion was witnessed during the
network shutdown on 23 March 2015, which did not just impact mobile phone services,
but also Internet access through Wi-Max networks. In addition, companies offering
Internet-based services such as Skype and messaging applications such as Whatsapp
and Blackberry may also be under threat, demonstrated by recent Government plans
to temporarily ban Whatsapp, and completely ban Blackberry’s secure messaging
service by December 2015.
Network shutdowns are a fundamental risk, not just to freedom of expression, national
or personal security or business operations, but also to the most fundamental of
sustainable development challenges faced by all states. The new UN Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs)23 are of direct relevance to Information and Communication
Technology companies (ICTs). The SDGs aim to:
“increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide
universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.”24
Therefore, stakeholders should consider the wider adverse impacts of network
shutdowns on human rights, such as:
•

Safety and Security: People are unable to assure friends and relatives that
they are safe during shutdowns, causing further panic in situations of
heightened tension. This concern came up frequently in the survey responses
for this report. Demonstrators, health workers, human rights observers, and
others are unable to call for help to be rescued from areas where protests
are happening. ICTs can be used by both citizens and terrorists, but shutting
down communication networks is a blunt instrument that deprives law
enforcement of the opportunity to use communications for the purpose of
fighting terrorism, and to disseminate important information to move people
to safety, or to calm a concerned population. Advancements in technology

23
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development (1 August 2015)
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/7891TRANSFORMING%20OUR%20
WORLD.pdf
Ibid. See 9.c
24
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•

•
•
•
•

•

are making use of “crowdsourcing” technology that can help develop early
warning systems and cement co-operation between citizens and law enforcement
to create a collective shield against terrorism.
Restricted Access to Emergency Services: A key dilemma concerns the
state duty to protect the right to life. A government may be trying to protect
the right to life - for example, by calling for network services to be shut down
in an attempt to prevent a bomb being detonated - but the action also risks
interrupting and stopping access to emergency services from a mobile phone.
Injured people are unable to call emergency services, such as an ambulance,
hospitals, fire and rescue via a mobile phone, and emergency services are
unable to communicate and locate people. Doctors/ health workers are unable
to access research or communicate in real time with each other. Health worker
survey respondents expressed concern that they are unable to communicate
directly with patients. People who need to contact police under different
circumstances are unable to do so via mobile phone, such as to report crimes,
in the event of an accident, or a hostage situation. This raises questions of
proportionality, and how to protect the right to life by ensuring people can
access emergency services. 69% of survey respondents for this report stated
they did not feel safer during network shutdowns.
Work: Small businesses are unable to operate and livelihoods are affected
during network shutdowns. For example, businesses are unable to access data
held in the cloud25.
Education: Students in institutions with hi-tech facilities cannot access
educational material during periods of network disruption. Student respondents
to the survey repeatedly voiced this as a concern.
Human Rights Defenders: Human rights groups are unable to monitor
situations
effectively
as
a
result
of
network
shutdowns.
eServices: Mobile banking transactions, relied on by millions of people,
cannot take place if network access is not available. Transmission of health
information on mobile phones also cannot take place. Other mobile services
that are likely to become popular in the future, such as voting, birth registration
and eGovernance, would be disrupted.
Economic Impacts: There is yet to be a full study conducted on the economic
impact of network shutdowns over time, but there is some indication of the
loss of taxes to the government paid by operators and citizens on services
that are not available during network shutdowns, not to mention lost revenues
of telecommunication companies.

The results of the survey conducted for this report in March 2015 during a shutdown in
Islamabad demonstrated there is often confusion among users as to what has happened
during a network shutdown and a lack of communication from the government fuels
speculation and suspicion. Responses range from expressions of frustration, anger,
boredom, and isolation. Notably, respondents felt themselves thrown back in time
to “being back in the ‘90s” or that disconnection from mobile phone networks is
“Probably what the Stone Age felt like.”
25
In the simplest terms, cloud computing means accessing files and applications over the
Internet, rather than on personal hard drives or servers, via third party services.
7

There are questions at an international level as to whether network shutdowns are a
proportionate response to specific security related threats. The impact on freedom
of expression is so severe that Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression from
the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the Representative on freedom of the
media from the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have
all concluded in a Joint Declaration that cutting off access to the Internet “for whole
populations or segments of the public can never be justified, including on public order
or national security grounds.”26
In a second Joint Declaration, they concluded that filtering or shutting down entire
parts of communications systems (mobile and Internet) during times of conflict can
“never be justified under human rights law.”27 Despite these strong statements at an
international level, they do not specifically address the issue of shutdowns of mobile
networks outside of situations of conflict.
Outside of Pakistan, efforts by civil society to engage governments in order to reduce
the frequency of network shutdowns have been attempted with varying degrees of
success, for example, in Egypt and Ireland, and by an operator in Kazakhstan. However,
companies and civil society have yet to join forces. Also, companies that offer Internetbased services, such as social networking (also known as “over the top” services),
have not yet publicly entered the debate, even though these services would also be
impacted by network shutdowns.

Recommendations for the Government of Pakistan:
•

•

26

Ensure continued access to emergency services. Explore ways in which the
emergency services can continue to operate even during periods of network
disruption including by working with telecommunication operators to find
ways to enable emergency calls.
Review the policy of network disconnection. Consider if network
disconnection is the most effective response to specific threats and explore
more targeted responses. Questions to examine include: Do extremist groups
have other means of communication, such as satellite communications, which
make disconnecting networks redundant? Are the costs of disrupting networks,
and attendant adverse impacts on daily lives, lower than the perceived benefit
of dealing with a threat? The Government should work with telecommunications
operators and civil society to find alternative methods to network shutdowns
wherever possible.

Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (2011) Article 6b.
http://www.osce.org/fom/78309?download=true
27
Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situation (2015) Article
4c http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37951/en/joint-declaration-on-freedom-of-expression-and-responses-to-conflict-situation
8

•

•
•

•

•

•

Review laws applicable to network disconnection. Investigate if current
laws require further clarification or if their scope can be narrowed (See Section
7 of this paper for examples from other countries where attempts were
made to change the law). Governments should develop legislation to deal
directly with suspension of mobile services in a clear and transparent manner,
taking into account international human rights obligations. Such legislation
should be subject to parliamentary review and judicial oversight.
Establish dialogue with companies. Increased engagement between the
Government and companies is vital to minimising the impact of shutdowns and
should be part of long-term efforts to find alternatives to shutdowns.
Engage with citizens. The results of the survey undertaken for this report
on perceptions of network disruptions highlight confusion and mixed feelings
about why and how shutdowns take place and confirm that a lack of
communication from the government fuels speculation and suspicion.
The Government should consider soliciting public views on the impact of
network shutdowns, with the aim of improving communication and transparency.
Be transparent. Wherever possible, the Government should make information
publicly available about when a shutdown will take place, for how long and
where. The Government should also make it a matter of public record after a
shutdown has taken place by confirming the areas impacted, dates and times,
plus the reason and legal justification, to improve transparency and reduce
confusion.
Ensure Better Oversight. The Government should consider a judicial or
executive oversight mechanism, independent of the regulator, to review
shutdown requests (before they are submitted and/or after the shutdown
has taken place) to check that shutdowns have been authorised and implemented
in accordance with the law and taking human rights concerns into account. The
oversight regime should report regularly on the appropriateness of the way in
which network shutdowns have been carried out and do so in ways that helps
the public understand whether procedures have been followed and human
rights considered.
Provide compensation to operators. Financial losses incurred during network
shutdowns should be adequately compensated in accordance with Section
54(3) of the 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act, Reason:
“National Security”28.

28
Section 54 states: “During a war or hostilities against Pakistan by any foreign power or internal
aggression or for the defence or security of Pakistan, the federal government shall have preference and
priority in the telecommunication system over any licensee. Upon proclamation of emergency by the
President, the Federal Government may suspend or modify all or any order or licences made or issued
under this Act or cause suspension of operation, functions or services of any licensee for such time as it
may deem necessary provided the federal government will compensate any licensee whose facilities or
services are affected by any action under this sub-section.”
http://www.pta.gov.pk/media/telecom_act_170510.pdf
See also, Telecommunications Industry Dialogue, Information on Country Legal Frameworks pertaining
to Freedom of Expression and Privacy in Telecommunications: Pakistan
http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/resources/pakistan/
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Recommendations for Telecommunications Operators:
•

•

•

•

•

Open dialogue with Governments. Telenor Pakistan and other operators in
Pakistan have made great efforts to engage the Government of Pakistan in
discussion, which has resulted in some limitations on network shutdowns in
terms of scope and duration, and a more streamlined process of submitting
requests. This demonstrates that while the issue is sensitive, positive change
can be achieved by opening a dialogue with governments.
Widen support within the industry through collective action. One
company is unlikely to be able to effect widespread change at a local level.
Telecommunication companies are finding a voice through membership
in global industry initiatives such as the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue,
a group of telecommunications operators and vendors who jointly address
freedom of expression and privacy rights in the telecommunications sector
in the context of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights29.
Other telecommunication operators worldwide face challenges similar to those
of Telenor Pakistan, and this platform could be used to exchange learning and
discuss ways forward, including how to encourage dialogue between local
operators on the ground.
Conduct stakeholder engagement. According to the UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, businesses should build relationships and
mutual understanding with stakeholders. In the ICT sector, in the case of
network disconnection, both the company and local civil society have the same
aim: to reduce the frequency of network shutdowns. Both can utilise their
distinct skills and leverage to achieve this by joining forces. Greater alignment
between business and civil society has the potential to produce real and longlasting action that will ultimately improve the enjoyment of human rights.
Create a consumer grievance mechanism. Customers should have effective
means to report adverse impacts experienced during network shutdowns
including on health, education and work. Companies should also explore how
customers can be compensated for loss of service during network shutdowns.
Ensure transparency. Public reporting on network shutdowns remains in
its infancy. One area where further development is possible is to explore
whether companies could publicly report instances when they have been
ordered to wholly or partially shut down a network, or when they have been
asked to block access to a particular service. The laws in some countries
prevent companies from even revealing this information, and some companies
believe the onus should be on governments to publish this information, not
companies. Telenor Group and the mobile operator Vodafone have taken
the step of including a review of laws they must abide by regarding suspension
of services30. In addition, the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue published
an online resource detailing the laws of 44 countries concerning freedom of

29
https://telecomindustrydialogue.org/
Telenor Group, Government Access Report- Legal Overview (May 2015)
30
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/GOVERNMENT-ACCESS-REPORT_05.pdf
See also Vodafone’s 2015 Law Enforcement Disclosure Report here:
http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/sustainability/2014/pdf/operating-responsibly/law_
enforcement_disclosure_report_2015_update.pdf
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expression and privacy in telecommunications, including an analysis of
Pakistan’s laws.31 This analysis is useful and can help develop advocacy
positions as a starting point for dialogue with governments.
This study highlights the need for further in depth research into government-ordered
network shutdowns and their adverse impacts on society. In the meantime, a more
concerted effort is needed to implement a streamlined process for requesting network
shutdowns. From the analysis of the process of requesting network shutdowns in
Pakistan, this report recommends that any process for requesting network shutdowns
include the following key characteristics:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Governments and ICT companies should refrain from authorising network
shutdowns impacting the entire country.
Network shutdowns should only be invoked in cases of real and imminent
threats to national security or national emergencies, and requests should
specify reason for such disruptions.
National law should be in place to regulate network shutdowns including which
bodies or agencies are authorised to make requests.
Shutdown requests should be approved or authorised by the highest level of
the government.
Clear request processes should be established, with a limited number of actors
in authorised law enforcement agencies allowed to make requests, and
designated individuals within operators to receive such requests.
All shutdown requests to network operators should be made in writing. The
request should specify the duration and geographical reach of the shutdown as
well as the reason, and demonstrating direct material necessity. Shutdowns
should be limited in duration and geographical area and proportionate to the
perceived level of risk.
Whenever possible, the public should be informed of network shutdowns,
including their duration, geography and services affected.
All network disruptions should be logged/recorded, and the government should
publish annually a list of all shutdowns.
Access to and communication with emergency services should be guaranteed
to the public at all times, including during network shutdowns.
Legislation concerning network shutdowns should be subject to on-going
review, including reviews by independent oversight bodies of specific events
and disruptions.

31
Telecommunications Industry Dialogue, Information on Country Legal Frameworks
pertaining to Freedom of Expression and Privacy in Telecommunications, June 2015.
http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/resources/country-legal-frameworks/
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1. Telecommunications in Pakistan
The Government of Pakistan awarded the first licenses to mobile operators in 1989.
Mobile telecommunications services began in 1991 with Instaphone as the first operator
to provide services. Instaphone was launched by the Pakistan telecommunications
company PAKOM Ltd, which was owned initially by Millicom International
(Luxembourg), and later by Arfeen Group (Pakistan). The company was the sole
provider of mobile telecommunications in the country until the operator Mobilink
(Pakistan) - now owned by Vimpelcom (Netherlands) - established GSM32 services in
1994. Ufone became the third mobile operator to enter the market in 2001. The staterun company Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) initially owned
Ufone and 26% of shares were sold in 2006 to the UAE-based telecommunications
company Etisalat.
In 2004, the Government of Pakistan auctioned two more mobile telecommunications
licenses. Telenor Pakistan, a subsidiary of the Norwegian company Telenor Group,
successfully secured one of these licenses. Warid Telecom, an Abu-Dhabi based
telecommunications company, secured the other. The operator Zong, a subsidiary of
China Mobile, entered the market in 2007. There are currently five mobile operators
competing in Pakistan: Mobilink, Ufone, Telenor Pakistan, Warid Telecom, and Zong.
Instaphone’s licence was cancelled in 2008 due to outstanding license fees.33
In April 2014, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) auctioned three 3G
licences and two 4G licences.34 Mobilink, Telenor Pakistan and Ufone acquired these
3G licences, while China Mobile’s Zong bought both 3G and 4G licenses. Ufone was
the other bidder for the second 4G license but was disqualified because of technical
reasons.35 At the time of writing, the only operator securing a 4G spectrum license is
Zong.
Pakistan is one of the fastest growing mobile telecoms markets in Asia. Foreign Direct
Investment in Pakistan’s telecommunication industry has amounted to US$12 billion36
32
The most prominent standard for protocol description in the 2G era of cellular telecommunications is known as the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) See GSMA website for
definition, http://www.gsma.com/aboutus/gsm-technology/gsm “GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) is an open, digital cellular technology used for transmitting mobile voice and data services.”
The News International, PTA cancels Instaphone, (5 January 2008)
33
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=89397&Cat=3&dt=4/27/2008

In addition there are systems for third generation (3G) and, more recently, fourth gener34
ation (4G) telecommunications networks and high-speed LTE (Long Term Evolution) standards for
cellular networks, which allows faster mobile Internet connectivity.
Azam Khan and Shahbaz Rana, The Tribune, First of its kind in Pakistan: 3G-4G auction
35
fetches $1.1 billion (24 April 2014)
http://tribune.com.pk/story/699628/first-of-its-kind-in-pakistan-3g-4g-auction-fetches-1-1-billion/

Nayyra Zeb, Fu Qiang & Muhammad Shabbi, Telecommunication Infrastructure and Foreign
36
Direct Investment in Pakistan: An Empirical Study, Global Journal of Management and Business Research:
B Economics and Commerce Volume 14 Issue 4 Version 1.0 Year 2014
http://globaljournals.org/GJMBR_Volume14/1-Telecommunication-Infrastructure-and-Foreign.pdf
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and the service covers over 90% of its geographical area.37 When Telenor Pakistan
entered the market in 2004, the total number of mobile subscriptions in Pakistan was
just under 13 million, out of a population of 158 million people. By 2015, total mobile
subscriptions reached over 116 million38, in a current population of over 180 million
people. Put another way, the total mobile penetration of Pakistan in 2002-2003 was
3.29%. As of July 2015 it is 61.45%39, assuming one unique person uses each phone.
In the last decade, the telecommunication industry’s tax contributions to the exchequer
have grown from PKR 38.4 billion (US$ 377 million) in 2003-04 to PKR 234.53 billion
(US$ 2.3 billion) in 2013-2014.40
Internet use is on the rise in Pakistan, via Wi-Fi Internet connections or using 3G
technology via mobile phones. There are around 50 Internet service providers (ISPs)
in Pakistan.

1.1 About Telenor Group
Telenor Pakistan is 100% owned by Telenor Group41, a telecommunications company
based in Norway. Telenor Group was established in 1855 and operates in 13 countries
across Europe and Asia.42
Worldwide, Telenor Group has over 187 million mobile subscribers and employs
around 33,000 people. Worldwide revenues in 2014 were NOK 107 billion (around
US $13.5 billion).43 Telenor Group holds a 33% non-controlling stake in Netherlands
based operator Vimpelcom, which is present in a further 14 countries. Vimpelcom
also has a stake in Mobilink, which has the largest market share of mobile services in
Pakistan.44
Telenor Group’s human rights policy states the company’s commitment to
implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,45 including
respect for freedom of expression and privacy. Telenor Group is a member of the
Telecommunications Industry Dialogue.
37
Farooq Baloch, The Tribune, FY2013: Telecom sector’s revenues reach all-time high (4 January
2014) http://tribune.com.pk/story/654539/fy2013-telecom-sectors-revenues-reach-all-time-high/
July 2015 figures available at: http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?Itemid=599
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
http://www.Telenor.com.pk/history
41
The 13 countries are: Telenor Norway, Telenor Denmark, Telenor Sweden, Telenor Hungary,
42
Telenor Montenegro, Telenor Serbia, Telenor Bulgaria, Telenor Pakistan, Telenor Myanmar,
Grameenphone (Bangladesh), dtac (Thailand) DiGi (Malaysia) Uninor (India)
Telenor Group Annual Report 2013
43
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Telenor-Group-Annual-Report-2013.pdf
44
http://www.Vimpelcom.com/Profile/Understanding-Vimpelcom/Brands/Mobilink/
http://www.Telenor.com/sustainability/human-rights/respect/
45
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Telenor Groups’s human rights policy acknowledges some of the challenges facing
telecommunications operators, including times governments may order the company
to shutdown communication services:
“Another type of request we may get is to shut down the network. Telenor does not
advocate the shutdown of its networks and believes that it is in the best interest
of its customers to minimise disruption of its services. However, in extraordinary
circumstances a government may require a network shutdown to protect its citizens
from terrorism or other serious safety or security threats. Telenor will comply only
as necessary and will resume operations as quickly as possible following such an
incident.”46
Telenor Groups’s 2013 annual report recognised that business in Pakistan is set to
grow, but that the benefits brought by telecommunications are being hampered by
network shutdowns:
“Total revenues in local currency increased by 3% driven by growth in subscriptions and
usage, but negatively affected by several regulatory restrictions including government
enforced network closures and a slow-down of economic growth in Pakistan.”47
In May 2015, Telenor Group published its first transparency report on government
requests for user data, covering the 13 countries in which Telenor Group operates
a subsidiary company. The report covers the number of times law enforcement
agencies in each country requested lawful interception (real time access to content
of communications such as phone calls) or access to communications data (such as
telephone numbers, time, duration and location of specific calls) in 2014.48 These
data are accompanied by a legal review of each country, disclosing where possible
the laws each Telenor Group subsidiary is compelled to disclose on issues such as
user communications or restricted access to services.49 The number of requests for
network shutdowns is yet to feature in Telenor Group’s transparency report nor is such
information included in the transparency reporting of any other telecommunications
operator.

46
http://www.Telenor.com/sustainability/human-rights/mitigate/
Telenor Group Annual Report, 2013, p11:
47
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Telenor-Group-Annual-Report-2013.pdf
Telenor Group, Authority Requests for Access to Electronic Communication- Country Data
48
(May 2015) http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Authority-requests-for-access-toelectronic-communication_04.pdf
Telenor Group, Government Access Report- Legal Overview (May 2015)
49
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/GOVERNMENT-ACCESS-REPORT_05.pdf
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1.2 Telenor Pakistan
Telenor Pakistan entered the mobile telecommunications market in Pakistan in 2004,
with an initial investment of US $1 billion to modernise and improve infrastructure. As
of August 2015, it currently has 31.49 million subscribers, which relates to individual
customers, out of a population of 158 million people. However there are 114.65
million mobile connections, which relates to the number of SIM cards connected to
Telenor Pakistan’s network.50 Telenor Pakistan has a market share of 27.4%, making
it Pakistan’s second largest operator just behind Mobilink with 29.15% of the market
share.51 Telenor Pakistan offers services in 3,500 cities and towns, covering more than
80% of the population. In 2014, Telenor Pakistan won one of the licenses to roll out
3G services and now offers mobile Internet to over 150 cities and towns throughout
the country.
Telenor Pakistan directly employs over 2,700 people in Pakistan and indirectly
employs 25,000 people in a network of over 200,000 retailers, comprising both local
agents and retail outlets.
Telenor Pakistan has its own code of conduct which, like the Group Code of Conduct, is
developed based on international and regional standards, including the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations.52 Each employee is
required to sign this code and undergo training on understanding and implementing
the principles and standards therein. Each employee undergoes annual, non-evaluated
“refresher” courses, which includes working through real life examples to show how
the code of conduct works in practice.

50
See Joss Gillet, GSMA, Measuring mobile penetration: Untangling ‘subscribers’, ‘mobile phone
owners’ and ‘users’ 22 May 2014, “If one individual actively uses two SIM connections, that person will
be counted by the industry as two mobile connections although he or she is only one mobile subscriber”
https://gsmaintelligence.com/research/2014/05/measuring-mobile-penetration/430/
Figures provided by Telenor Pakistan, August 2015
51
http://www.Telenor.com.pk/cr/pdf/newCOC.pdf
52
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2. History of Network Shutdowns in
Pakistan
According to the Global Terrorism Index published by the Institute for Economics and
Peace, 17,958 people died in terrorist incidents around the world in 2013.53
Of these, Pakistan accounted for 13.1%, ranking third, after Iraq and Afghanistan.
Terrorism is a major and genuine security threat in Pakistan.
In 2013, there were 1,933 terrorist “incidents”, which killed 2,345 people and injured
5,035.54 In the same year, 23 different terrorist groups were known to be operating in
Pakistan. The Global Terrorism Index reports that Islamist groups make up a significant
portion of this total. The largest, responsible for 49% of claimed attacks is Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban. However, in nearly half of all attacks in
the country in 2014, no group claimed responsibility.55
Terrorism in Pakistan takes many forms.56 These include attacks on armed forces and
their families by rebel groups; attacks by the Pakistani Taliban and other organisations
against organs of state; attacks within Pakistan among political rivals; religious violence
against minority communities; intra-Muslim violence, usually targeted against Shia
Muslims; violence spilling over from the weakly-guarded border with Afghanistan;
and, in the past, violence involving the Mohajir community (Muslims who migrated
from India at the time of Partition in 1947), as victims or perpetrators.
Terrorism victims include prominent politicians such as former prime minister Benazir
Bhutto, former Punjab governor Salman Taseer, and former minister of minority
affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, and scores of civilians, often during religious processions,
religious holidays, or at shrines.
Following the tragic attack57 on the Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December
2014, the Government of Pakistan amended the constitution to allow for “speedy”
trial of offences relating to terrorism.58
53
Vision of Humanity, Global Terrorism Index
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gti-findings
Vision of Humanity, Global Terrorism Index Report 2014, p18:
54
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20
Report%202014.pdf
Ibid.
55
The Global Terrorism Index defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force
56
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear,
coercion, or intimidation.” (Ibid p6)
John Boone and Ewan MacAskill, The Guardian, More than 100 children killed in Taliban
57
attack on Pakistan school (16 December 2014)
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/16/taliban-attack-army-public-school-pakistanpeshawar
The Constitution of Pakistan, Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Act, 2015
58
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/21amendment.html
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The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won the 2008 elections following the resignation of
General Pervez Musharraf, but political stability and national security were a growing
concern.59 During this time, more civilians, security personnel, known terrorists and
insurgents were being killed every year.60
Between 2008 and 2012, 12,020 civilians were killed in terrorism-related violence.61
Terrorist groups also began using technology to advance their aims. ICT-enabled tactics
included using messages exchanged through mobile phones and setting off explosives
from remote locations through mobile technology.
In 2012, the then Interior Minister of Pakistan began ordering mobile network
shutdowns in more parts of the country as a tool aimed at curbing terrorist activities.
Before 2012, Telenor Pakistan said that network shutdowns (or “blackouts” as they
were referred to then) were experienced mostly in Balochistan, coinciding with
the military operations that started in early 2005. Shutdowns now occur around a
wider range of events, such as religious or national holidays, protests and marches.
Shutdowns usually block mobile services, such as voice, SMS and mobile Internet.62
According to Telenor Pakistan, these shutdowns peaked in 2012 and 2013 with a
decline following the May 2013 elections. The elections ushered in the opposition
Pakistan Muslim League, led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who promised a more
“business friendly” agenda and sought closer co-operation with business to help boost
the economy.63 The change in government was accompanied by a partial reduction in
shutdowns.
The Islamabad based digital rights group Bytes for All began keeping a record of all
network shutdowns that occurred in the country from 201264, part of which is included
as an Annex in this paper. These records suggest network shutdowns began to slow in
2014, but still continue to this day.
According to these data, it is rare for whole regions or provinces to experience a
shutdown, although the regions of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan do appear to
face occasional disruptions in their entirety. However, many towns and cities can
be impacted at one time by network shutdowns, which essentially means potentially
59
Arfan Shahzad, Dawood Ali Mithani, Abdullah Kaid Al Swidi , Faudziah Hanim Bt Fadzil,
Political Stability and the Foreign Direct Investment: Inflows in Pakistan. Table 10 Political Stability
Indicators, British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences ISSN: 20469578, Vol.9 No.II (2012)
http://www.bjournal.co.uk/paper/BJASS_9_2/BJASS_09_02_08.pdf
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2015
60
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm
Ibid.
61
ARTICLE 19, Pakistan: Government must stop ‘kill switch’ tactics (23 August 2012)
62
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3422/en/pakistan:-government-must-stop%27kill-switch%27-tactics
Business Recorder, PML-N government is business friendly (17 August 2013)
63
http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/108-pakistan-top-news/131719-pml-n-government-isbusiness-friendly.html
http://www.killswitch.pk
64
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millions of people are affected in wide geographical areas.
For example, during the Day of Ashura in 2014, Bytes for All reported that a
network shutdown impacted a total of 56 cities and towns in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber
Pakhtunkhawa, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, which are almost all
of the regions in Pakistan.
Although the threat of terrorism remains very real in Pakistan, there is concern among
civil society groups that network shutdowns are becoming the norm. They contend that
such disruptions are an inadequate tool to control the wider problem of terrorism, and
grind much of day-to-day life to a halt.
In addition, the Government of Pakistan rarely communicates the reason for shutdowns,
either before or after the fact, nor does it confirm when and where they have happened,
which creates confusion and suspicion among citizens.
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3. The Network Shutdown Process in
Pakistan: Telenor Pakistan’s Role and
Responsibilities
65

The process of shutting down mobile networks in Pakistan was only streamlined across
all operators in 2009, when the Ministry of Information Technology issued a directive to
the national regulator, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA),66 following
appeals from operators for a formal, established process. Before 2009, any part of
the government or its law enforcement agencies could request operators to shutdown
the network, and no common process or focal point was in place for the submission of
these requests. This ad hoc method posed clear problems for the company, including
its relationship with the State and its own responsibilities with respect to human
rights. Although the directive was issued in 2009, Telenor Pakistan told IHRB during
an interview as part of the preparation of this report that the process was not actually
established until 2012.
The Government’s policy directive defined a standard operating procedure for shutting
down mobile networks. A shutdown request is now always routed through the PTA, so
the operator knows it has been verified. A number of law enforcement agencies are
authorised to request network shutdowns to the PTA, but the identity of these agencies
remain confidential and not public knowledge. A designated person in an authorised
law enforcement agency typically submits a request to the PTA for a network shutdown.
Because requests are sent via the PTA, the telecommunications operator may not be
aware of which specific law enforcement agency has made a specific request. Telenor
Pakistan, like other operators in Pakistan, is obligated to shut down their network
when ordered by the PTA and this provision is included in the company’s operating
license. The PTA Director General of Enforcement is the only person authorised to
communicate shutdown requests to telecom operators.
According to Telenor Pakistan, there does not seem to be a standard notice period
given in order to implement a Government shutdown request. During interviews as part
of the preparation of this report, one employee told IHRB that a notice of 12-14 hours
is given, while another employee said three hours notice was a more accurate figure.
Several employees verified that some requests require the shutdown with immediate
effect in case of an imminent threat or a high security situation. These requests can
come in at any time of the night or day.
Telenor Pakistan said reasons for shutdown requests are usually quite general, such as
“security” related matters. Once a request has been sent in writing (usually an email)
by the PTA’s Director General of Enforcement to the designated person in Telenor
Pakistan authorised to receive such requests, the technical team begins the process
of shutting down the requested part of the network. The request usually specifies the
geographical area, time and duration of the shutdown.
65
66

This process was described to IHRB by Telenor Pakistan’s Regulatory and Technical teams.
http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?Itemid=1
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Shutdown requests are usually restricted to a small geographical area, described by
Telenor Pakistan as “surgical” shutdowns, rather than “blanket” shutdowns, where
cities or the entire country is affected. Telenor Pakistan representatives indicated that
“surgical” shutdowns, blocking only sensitive areas rather than entire cities, require
much more time and effort on the part employees as services in that area may be
provided by more than one cell tower. It may also be necessary to shut down a wider area
than specified, to ensure there is no “spillover” of service -- i.e. communications being
accessible just outside of the designated shutdown site. Telenor Pakistan maintains a
record of each shutdown. Before such disruptions became routine, Telenor Pakistan
used to send reports, including financial losses to the company, to the PTA. However,
when the Government made no resulting compensatory payments, this practice was
stopped.

Key Observations:
The process for requesting network shutdowns in Pakistan currently follows several key
steps:
• A request is submitted by an authorised law enforcement agency to the
Regulator, the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA).
• The PTA verifies the request and submits it to a designated person in the
telecommunications operator in writing.
• The request specifies the geographical area, time and duration of
shutdown.
While Telenor Pakistan has never refused to implement a shutdown request, the
company said it has engaged the Government, usually by requesting a narrowing of
the scope of specific requests. As a result, Telenor Pakistan says shutdowns today
are more ‘surgical’, focusing on high-risk geographical areas, rather than blanket
shutdowns over entire cities. However, as many provinces and cities may be impacted
by one shutdown, the operator has an ongoing dialogue with the regulator to explore
how shutdowns can be limited in scope and duration. The operator keeps a record of
each network shutdown.
• The operator may have to implement the shutdown in a wider area to
prevent “spillover”.
Despite reforms over the past few years, there continues to be no standard notice
period given to the operator and the length of time networks are disrupted varies
greatly. From the limited records available, it appears shutdowns can last from isolated
occasions of several hours to a few shutdowns repeated over several days. In addition,
areas outside of the designated shutdown area, known as “spillover”, can be affected
as well. This means areas where no security threat exists may end up with limited
access to mobile communications.
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Telenor Pakistan attempted to challenge the legal justification for shutdowns of any
kind, but the law remains vague and wide in scope, as the next section of this report
discusses in more detail.

4. The International and National Legal
Framework
4.1 Pakistan’s Responsibilities under International Human Rights
Law
Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
in 2010 and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) in 2008.
Freedom of expression is enshrined in international law and is reflected in almost
every country’s constitution, including Pakistan. Under international law, the universal
right to freedom of expression is well defined and clarified in a number of legally
binding instruments and further declarations and principles:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948:
Article 19:“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966:
Article 19: “1. Everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include the
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.”
Under international law, each country may have its own reservations on freedom of
expression according to the country’s social and religious norms, which are reflected
in that country’s domestic law. Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR states,
“The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.”
A country’s history may dictate the restrictions it legally places on freedom of expression,
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in order to protect the rights of others.67 Further clarification on the application of
Article 19 paragraph 3 (which allows for restrictions on freedom of expression) is
recorded in UN General Comment 34.68 Paragraph 34 of the General Comment also
introduces the principle of proportionality:
“Restrictions must not be overbroad. The Committee observed in general comment
No. 27 that “restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality;
they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function; they
must be proportionate to the interest to be protected...The principle of proportionality
has to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions but also by the
administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law”.
Therefore, any restriction on fundamental rights must be proportionate to the threat
posed, provided for by law, and strictly necessary to achieve a proper public purpose,
such as public safety. It is up to the State to demonstrate that a network shutdown is
proportionate to the threat proposed.
UN treaty bodies have not to date issued concluding observations on Pakistan’s
implementation of the right to freedom of expression under the ICCPR in relation to
network shutdowns.

4.2 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The ITU is the UN’s specialised agency for promoting development and use of ICTs.
Membership includes the UN’s 193 Member States, and also ICT regulators, academic
institutions and over 700 private companies.69
The Constitution of the ITU protects the free flow of information and the right to
communicate70 and allows for network shutdowns in certain situations, albeit with
unclear definitions:

67
Freedom of expression is not an absolute right and in order to protect the rights of others,
states are permitted to derogate from this. See ICCPR Article 19:3 “The exercise of the rights provided
for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be as are provided by law and are necessary:
for respect of the rights or reputations of others; for the protection of national security or of public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.”
UN General Comment 34, Article 19: Freedom of expression CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September
68
2011. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf
http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx
69
See for example, Article 33 of the Constitution, The Right of the Public to Use the
70
International Telecommunications Service
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/09/S02090000115201PDFE.PDF (p37) and,
Recommendation 2, Unrestricted Transmission of News and the Right To Communicate (Kyoto 1994)
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/09/S02090000115201PDFE.PDF (p655)
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Article 34/181: “Member States also reserve the right to cut off, in accordance
with their national law, any other private telecommunications which may appear
dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to
decency.”
The ambiguity in terms such as ‘public order’ and ‘decency’ make it difficult to ascertain
the specific situations in which shutdowns are justified.

4.3 Expert International Opinion on Network Shutdowns
Access to the Internet is well regarded as an enabler to freedom of expression.71 Experts
from various bodies have declared that network shutdowns can rarely be justified due
to the impact on freedom of expression. In 2011, Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of
Expression from the UN, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights issued a Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and
the Internet, which stated:
“Cutting off access to the Internet, or parts of the Internet, for whole populations or
segments of the public (shutting down the Internet) can never be justified, including
on public order or national security grounds. The same applies to slow-downs imposed
on the Internet or parts of the Internet.”72
In May 2015, the same consortium of Special Rapporteurs issued a Joint Declaration
on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situations. This declaration states:
“…using communication ‘kill switches’ (i.e. shutting down entire parts of
communications systems)… are measures that can never be justified under human
rights law.”73
While these statements cover Internet shutdowns and network shutdowns in conflict
situations, there is ambiguity as to the impact of mobile shutdowns in a government
proclaimed “emergency”.

4.4 Pakistan’s National Laws
Article 19 of the Pakistan Constitution enshrines freedom of speech as a fundamental
right, subject to several restrictions.
71
See Report of the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom
of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, 16th May 2011. UN General Assembly A/HRC/17/27.
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“Article 19: Freedom of Speech etc.
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall
be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by the law in
the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any
part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality,
or in relation to contempt of court, commission of or incitement to violence.”74
In addition, the Pakistan Constitution guarantees the right to information, which is
impacted by a network shutdown:
“19A. Right to Information:
Every citizen shall have the right to have access to information in all matters of public
importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law.”
While Pakistan has no direct constitutional provision regarding suspending mobile
service, the government has cited Article 148 of the Constitution as justification.
Article 148 (3) states:
“It shall be the duty of the Federation to protect every Province against external
aggression and internal disturbances and to ensure that the Government of every
Province is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
The suspension of services has also been justified under Article 54(2) and 54(3) of
the 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act75, Reason: “National
Security”. It states that:
“54 (2) During a war or hostilities against Pakistan by any foreign power or internal
aggression or for the defence or security of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall
have preference and priority in the telecommunication system over any licensee.
54(3) Upon proclamation of emergency by the President, the Federal Government may
suspend or modify all or any order or licences made or issued under this Act or cause
suspension of operation, functions or services of any licensee for such time as it may
deem necessary provided the Federal Government will compensate any licensee whose
facilities or services are affected by any action under this sub-section.”
According to the international NGO, ARTICLE 19, which campaigns globally for the
right to freedom of expression and freedom of information, Article 54(3) is inconsistent
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Industry Dialogue, Information on Country Legal Frameworks pertaining to Freedom of Expression and
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with the permitted restrictions on freedom of expression under the ICCPR.76
During interviews for this report, Telenor Pakistan officials told IHRB that the company
has disputed and contested the use of Section 54(3) for invoking network shutdowns,
since these powers can only be invoked if a state of emergency has been declared in
the country. Telenor Pakistan believes that in the absence of a state of emergency,
the provision does not apply and therefore network shutdowns are orders without any
legal basis.
In 2012 Telenor Pakistan filed a writ petition in the Sindh High Court77, and this case
is still pending at the time of writing. In addition, citizens have filed writ petitions to
challenge network shutdowns for the reasons that these shutdowns caused disruption
in their personal and professional lives and were a threat to their security and wellbeing.
Around the same time as Telenor Pakistan filed a writ petition, another was filed
by a gynaecologist, Dr Nishat Fatima, on the basis that shutdowns prevented her
from communicating with her patients.78 According to reports, during one particular
shutdown a patient who was pregnant was unable to get in touch with Dr. Fatima when
she wasn’t feeling well and when Dr. Fatima was able to make contact discovered the
pregnant woman had lost her baby.79
Telenor Pakistan officials indicated that as a result of the initial hearings of the writ
petition filed by the company, as well as on account of similar writ petitions filed in the
Sindh High Court by ordinary citizens, the court passed an initial order on 25 October
2012 that any directive to shutdown the network should be made through a “speaking
order with cogent reasons given for it” and that it should only apply to specific areas
and be valid for a specific duration.
This is a significant development because a speaking order sets out reasons and
rationale for a decision and cogent reasons for an order means that specific and
actionable grounds are given for the order, thus making it easier to challenge before
the courts. In addition, the reference to “specific areas” and a “specific duration”
restricts the government’s power to make open-ended orders for whole cities and for
inordinately long periods and instead imposes upon them the requirement to pass an
order which is targeted and a specific, reasonable duration.
76
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Before this order was passed, any directive for suspending the network did not need to
provide a rationale or reasoning and could extend to whole cities and be open-ended.
However, owing primarily to the general delays in the adjudication of legal cases by the
courts in Pakistan, Telenor Pakistan’s writ petition is yet to be conclusively determined
with a substantive final order on the overall merits of the case, including the issue of
compensation for the financial losses suffered as a result of network shutdowns.
The Constitution of Pakistan clearly protects the right to free expression and
information. It is not clear under the Telecom Law if the Government has the authority
to shut down the network, and if so, under which specific circumstances. It is therefore
difficult to determine how tests of necessity and proportionality would be carried out.
It appears the policy of network shutdowns in Pakistan and the law governing them
would benefit from a Government review that reflects the country’s international
human rights obligations.
Section 7 describes some instances from other countries where relevant laws were
clarified and the scope of network shutdowns narrowed, in an effort to limit the
frequency and potential for negative impacts on citizens.
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5. The Network Shutdown on Pakistan Day
- 23 March 2015
Pakistan Day is a national holiday held on 23 March each year to commemorate the
signing of the 1940 Lahore Resolution, which called for an independent Muslim state
that became Pakistan.
Pakistan Day has historically been commemorated with a large joint military parade in
the centre of Islamabad, featuring displays by the Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The last such parade took place in 2008, but was put on hold amid security concerns.
In 2015, the National Day Parade was again held in Islamabad, at a specially built site
near Shakar Parian Park. 80
According to Bytes for All, in the run up to 23 March, there were rumours that mobile
communications would be suspended from 11 March and disruption would last for 13
days. Restrictions would reportedly apply to a 5km radius around the site earmarked
for the National Day Parade in Shakar Parian Park in the centre of Islamabad, as well
as areas of Rawalpindi. This area covered a number of densely populated residential
and commercial areas, as well as a major hospital, the Shifa International Hospital.
On 11 March, a number of residents in the area took to social media to complain about
a loss of mobile service and to ask whether a shutdown was taking place.81 Neither
the Government nor the regulator, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA),
issued any public communication to clarify the situation.
The National Day Parade passed peacefully, and it was only after the event that it was
possible for IHRB to clarify with Telenor Pakistan what had happened with regards
to the shutdown. According to reports, on 11 March, all mobile operators in Pakistan
received a request to shutdown mobile communications within a 5km radius of the
parade site from 12 to 23 March 2015. The reason given for the unprecedented
duration of the shutdown was that dress rehearsals would be taking place over the
days leading up to the Parade.
Representatives from the main mobile operators met with representatives from the
Government of Pakistan and the PTA to express their concerns about the scope and
scale of the requested shutdown. They pointed out that a key issue involved the fact
that a major hospital lay inside the shutdown site, and that disruption of network
service was impacting patients and relatives, visiting hours, ambulances and hospital
staff communication.
The shutdown site also included an airport, the area of Shamsabad, Faizabad and
the area of Rawalpindi, outside of Islamabad. There was no reported security threat
in Rawalpindi or the surrounding areas. This area was shutdown in order to deal
80
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with “spillover”(i.e. communications being able to be accessed just outside of the
designated shutdown site).
Following conversations with the mobile operators, the Government of Pakistan and
the PTA agreed to limit the shutdown between 5 am and 2 pm on 21 March, when a
full military dress rehearsal took place, and during the same period on 23 March, the
day of the parade itself, rather than the extended period originally requested.82
All GSM/3G/4G services, Wi-MAX (a form of Wi-Fi capable of connectivity across greater
distances) and CDMA (similar to GSM) services would be shutdown during these times,
impacting nearly all voice and data services. While the scope of the shutdown was
limited, the extent of services impacted was greater than other shutdowns, which had
been restricted to mobile services, rather than including Internet access (as in this case
Wi-MAX was also affected).
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The parade took place between 8am and 12pm on 23 March 2015.

6. The Impact of Network Shutdowns and
Effectiveness of Government Policy
In September 2015, the UN adopted a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) aimed at combating poverty and advancing health, education, livelihoods, and
access to information, as well as tackling gender and income inequality among other
objectives.83
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is a key enabler to all of these,
including in low-income countries, and the SDGs aim to, “increase access to information
and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access
to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.84
Network shutdowns are therefore a fundamental risk, not just to freedom of expression,
national or personal security or business operations, but also to the most fundamental
of sustainable development challenges faced by all states.
In the summer of 2014 Bytes for All, the Centre for Internet and Human Rights
(CIHR) and IHRB developed a research project and survey methodology intended to
better understand the effects of network disconnections. Bytes for All conducted 190
face to face field surveys to collect firsthand information on impacts in the immediate
aftermath of the Pakistan network shutdown on 23 March 2015. Survey respondents
were selected at random and from Bytes for All’s contacts, from a range of occupations
including business professionals, journalists, doctors, teachers and lecturers, students
and human rights defenders.
The results of these surveys served as a catalyst for further research into the identified
impacts and for the development of recommendations to mitigate adverse impacts of
network disruptions on fundamental rights.
Although the shutdown took place over a public holiday, and therefore perhaps had
a more limited impact than on a normal work day, the extent of services affected was
greater than previous shutdowns, which had been restricted to mobile services, rather
than including Internet access (as in this case Wi-MAX was also affected).
Overleaf we highlight some of the impacts identified by respondents, which suggested
the need for further research.
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6.1 Safety and Security
Survey respondents were asked if they relied on other forms of communication during
network shutdowns. Respondents said they often reverted to using landlines during
shutdowns, which are not usually affected. Other messaging apps such as Whatsapp
and Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) tools such as Skype are typically available
when they can connect to Wi-Fi.
However, Government officials have contended that terrorists are also attempting to
circumvent mobile network shutdowns by using other methods of communication,
such as Skype.85 The Government has therefore previously floated plans to ban tools
such as Skype and messaging apps such as Whatsapp and Viber, which are usually
still available over Wi-Fi during mobile network shutdowns.86 The Government of Sindh
province decided to block these services for three months in 2013,87 although this
seemed at odds with central Government policy, which reportedly did not want to
impose such a ban.88
In July 2015, it was reported that Pakistan’s telecommunications regulator had issued
a directive to operators to permanently shutdown Blackberry services, which features
an encrypted messaging service. This order was to be implemented before December
2015.89 This indicates that the trend of blocking communication services for security
reasons may be set to increase in scope, yet there appears to be inconsistency and no
official policy or consultation on this proposal. Such expansion was witnessed during
the network shutdown on 23 March 2015, which did not just impact mobile phone
services, but also Internet access through Wi-Max networks.
While it is clear that ICTs can be used both for good purposes as well as for bad, shutting
down communication networks is a blunt instrument that deprives law enforcement of
communications tools for the purpose of fighting terrorism and protecting public safety.
One survey respondent reflected that leaving communications networks functional
would be a more effective strategy as “we can catch terrorists through networking
instead of disconnection.”
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In fact, “crowdsourcing” information and verifying reports can act as an “early
warning” system concerning planned or potential attacks. One of the founders of the
Kenyan organisation, Ushahidi, a crowd sourcing platform established in the wake of
the 2008 post-election violence, said in an interview following the 2015 attacks on
Kenya’s Garissa University,
“Most people agree that ordinary citizens should be involved in the prevention and
response to terrorism. However, these noble thoughts are ineffective without having
tools that enable ordinary citizens to share information quickly and privately, and tools
that enable law enforcement agencies to process, verify and escalate that information
promptly. Technology does not replace citizens or law enforcement agencies but the
right platform can make that relationship a lot more effective.”90
After the London riots in 2011, the Government of the United Kingdom contemplated
cutting off access to social networks in times of social unrest, due to the assumption
that the encrypted instant messaging service on Blackberry and Twitter was popular
among the rioters who used those services to organise some of the rioting.
However, intervention from police forces and testimonies showed that the technology
also had a positive effect, with social networking being used to locate looters, dispel
rumours, and appeal for calm. As a result, those plans were shelved.
A study of the riots by the British newspaper The Guardian, and the London School
of Economics (LSE) found that although some users were sending police social media
messages that incited violence, Twitter was also used extensively to organise community
clean-up operations in the following days.91 A recent study by European researchers
concluded that censoring/blocking social media sites in times of social unrest could
in fact provoke more violent protests.92 In Pakistan, outbreaks of violence occurred
during network shutdowns, as in a procession during Ashura in 2013.93
In times of a national emergency, fully functioning communication systems are
essential. Lack of access to such facilities could have fatal consequences for affected
parties. Reports from people affected by suspension of services are becoming more
common, such as individuals being caught in the middle of protests and unable to
call friends or relatives for help, or being unable to locate or trace their family and
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friends. This can cause or contribute to panic.94 This concern came up frequently in
survey responses. A number of respondents said that they “cannot connect to anyone
in an emergency” and were “unable to connect with our family.”
Mobile phones can be enormously useful for victims and affected parties during times
of crisis. Police in Indian-administrated Kashmir95 have reported that mobile phones
have saved the lives of hundreds of people trapped in buildings stormed by suicide
attackers. People trapped in buildings during disasters or terrorist attacks have been
able to communicate with authorities or their families when lines of communication
have remained open. Hostages have often communicated with the police through
mobile phones and managed to guide law enforcement to rescue them. On one such
occasion, a senior police official told Reuters,
“This is the success story of mobile phones in anti-militancy operations.”96
Relying on network shutdowns to prevent terrorist attacks deprives both citizens and
law enforcement alike the opportunity to use communication tools in the fight against
terrorism. While States are increasingly relying on monitoring and surveillance of
communications, which can be controversial and often illegal, there are opportunities
for ICTs to be developed as a collective shield against terrorism.

6.2 Restricted Access to Emergency Services
The people of Pakistan are served by several emergency services, but during a network
shutdown these services become largely inaccessible as communicating with them
is not possible from a mobile phone.97 Survey respondents highlighted that during
network shutdowns injured people are unable to call via a mobile phone emergency
services, such as an ambulance, hospitals, fire and rescue, and emergency services are
unable to communicate and locate people. People who need to contact police under
different circumstances, such as to report crimes or in the event of an accident or a
hostage situation face similar situations.
One respondent legitimately suggested that, “I feel more insecure to be honest,
how would I call the police and ambulance?” This also extends to healthcare where
survey respondents who work as medical practitioners asserted serious concerns about
shutdowns for those they serve. As one put it, “our patients suffer a lot for it.”
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Open communication channels are also used in the event of a disaster to disseminate reliable
information such as directions to support services, where to get medical help, and what to do
next. For example, mobile services could be used to divert people away from already overloaded
hospitals, which could otherwise increase the disaster.98

6.3 Work
Respondents employed by businesses reported that they were affected by network shutdowns
in that they could not receive or make calls, which slowed productivity. Some respondents who
are office workers said they were unable to work due to the shutdown of email and Internet
connections. If Internet services are also suspended, it is logical to assume that businesses are
unable to access data held in the cloud.99 Journalists also responded that network shutdowns
affected their ability to research or file stories on deadline.

6.4 Education
Student respondents to the survey said that during network disruptions they could not access
research materials or access online lessons, and were “unable to complete university assignments
and projects”. One student also said that, “notes and slides cannot be downloaded to help with
exam revision.”

Other Impacts Of Note:
6.5 Human Rights Defenders
The use of technology for human rights is well documented, and grassroots organisations regularly
take advantage of communication tools to organise and campaign for various causes. In addition,
ICTs have enabled greater monitoring of situations and documenting events as they unfold. For
example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has detailed the benefits of ICTs for gathering information
on human rights violations and drawing attention to situations of actual or potential abuses by
“live-tweeting”. 100 As outlined in Section 7, HRW researchers noted that the network shutdown
during protests in Kazakhstan had cut off communication with human rights monitors on the
ground and had made people “extremely vulnerable”.
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6.6. eServices
Pakistan is keen to invest in its ICT sector, create economic opportunities and improve
digital literacy. There are plans for an eGovernance master plan, which aims to use
ICTs to deliver efficient and cost-effective public services to citizens as well as increase
efficiency, transparency, and accountability in decision-making.101
In addition, millions of people rely on mobile banking. Telenor Pakistan was the first
network operator in Pakistan to offer mobile banking, when it launched Easypaisa in
2009. Easypaisa covers 800 cities and serves over 6 million people each month who
manage their money via their mobile phones. Almost 600,000 transactions take place
nationwide each day, from 65,000 agents or shops nationwide. In 2014, there were
146 million Easypaisa transactions worth a total of US$4 billion. In 2014, almost
2% of Pakistan’s GDP moved though Easypaisa. This service is unavailable during a
network shutdown.
Transmission of health information on mobile phones also cannot take place.102 A
Telenor Pakistan and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) initiative is currently
under trial to enable people in Pakistan to register births with the aid of their mobile.103
Such services would also be unavailable during network shutdowns.

6.7 Economic Impacts
The cost of network shutdowns is difficult to estimate and figures are hard to come by.
In 2011, the OECD104 estimated that the 5-day shutdown in Egypt incurred direct costs
of at minimum US $90 million from lost revenues due to blocked telecommunications
and Internet services, which account for around US $18 million per day. However, the
actual figure is possibly much higher, as the study did not take into account secondary
economic impacts, which resulted in loss of business from other sectors. If the shutdown
had continued every day for a year, it would cost Egypt roughly 3-4% of GDP.
Another indication of the economic costs is reflected by the case involving former
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, former prime minister Ahmed Nazif and former
minister of Interior Habib Al-Adly, who are currently appealing a collective fine of EGP
540m (about US$ 69 million), as compensation for operators and Internet companies’
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financial losses incurred during the 2011 shutdown.105
Shutdowns have caused losses of tax revenue to the Government of Pakistan. It was
reported that shutdowns during the Eid (a major national holiday) in 2012 caused
an estimated loss of 507 million Pakistani rupees (PKR) (US$ 49 million) in taxes
from the mobile operators to the exchequer.106 Shutdowns in November 2012 during
Ashura, a religious day in the Islamic calendar, are estimated to have caused PKR 500
million (US$ 49.02 million) of losses to the Government in tax revenue from cellular
subscribers.107
The 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act states that network
providers would be compensated for the losses they may have incurred as a result of
action taken under Section 54, which has been used to justify shutdowns (see Section
6):
“Provided that the Federal Government may compensate any licensee whose facilities
or services are affected by any action under this sub-section.”
Compensation to operators is an issue that has not been resolved in Pakistan. An online
tech publication, Propakistani.com, reported that telecom companies lost PKR 2.6
billion (US$ 25 million) in the shutdown on Eid in August 2012.108 In February 2013,
Telenor Pakistan requested compensation of PKR 163 million (US$ 1.59 million) for
losses incurred because of shutdowns in 2012 and in January 2013 along with other
telecom operators, which the company has not received.109

6.8 People’s opinions of network shutdowns
As part of the survey, respondents were asked their personal opinion of how they
felt during network shutdowns. The responses received were diverse and range from
expressions of frustration to anger and isolation. Notably, respondents felt themselves
thrown back in time to “being back in the 90s” or even further that disconnection from
mobile phone networks is “probably what the Stone Age felt like.”
105
Amira El-Fekki, Daily News Egypt, Court to rule on Mubarak’s appeal in telecommunications
case on 24 October (4 July 2015) http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/07/04/court-to-rule-onmubaraks-appeal-in-telecommunications-case-on-24-october/
Aamir Attaa, Propakistani, Mobile Companies Lost PKR 2.6 Billion On Eid Day Due to Cellular
106
Shut Down (23 August 2012) http://propakistani.pk/2012/08/23/mobile-companies-lost-pkr-2-6billion-on-eid-day-due-to-cellular-shut-down/
Aamir Attaa, Propakistani, Pakistan Telecom Saw Two Darkest Days of Its History (26 November
107
2012) http://propakistani.pk/2012/11/26/pakistan-telecom-darkest-days-history/
Aamir Attaa Mobile Companies Lost PKR 2.6 Billion On Eid Day Due to Cellular Shut Down
108
(23 August 2012) http://propakistani.pk/2012/08/23/mobile-companies-lost-pkr-2-6-billion-oneid-day-due-to-cellular-shut-down/
Tribune, Telenor asks govt to pay Rs163m for forced cellular suspension losses: Report (11
109
February 2013) http://tribune.com.pk/story/505711/Telenor-asks-govt-to-pay-rs163m-for-forcedcellular-suspension-losses-report/
35

The main emotions associated with disconnection included isolation, embarrassment
and just plain boredom. While some respondents preferred to simplify their
experience as simply “absolutely rubbish” others responded more poetically seeing
the disconnection of communications “like a sea without water.” Some respondents
did report feeling “relaxed” and “happy” during periods of shutdowns.
These responses are also indicative of a more general trend among respondents who
suggested they would themselves not take the same measures if they were in power.
When asked whether they would be willing to disconnect communications services, the
vast majority of respondents (72%) said no.
A large portion of survey respondents (69%) said they did not feel safer when
communications are shutdown for security reasons. A frequent response was general
scepticism of the impact of network shutdowns in improving security. Some respondents
suggested disconnecting mobile phone networks “has no effect on security” or simply
that “it doesn’t make any sense.” Equally, it is argued that, “terrorists have other ways
[to communicate] e.g. satellite phones”. This is not to say respondents are opposed to
security measures per se, but that they are sceptical of the disconnection’s efficacy in
achieving security. One respondent argued that disconnecting mobile phone networks
“is not a safety measure. Actually, true and relevant safety measures are desired.”
The reflections from respondents in the survey indicate that there is scope for the
Government of Pakistan to engage with citizens on the issue and consider soliciting
public views on the impacts of network shutdowns, with the aim of improving
communication and transparency. Furthermore, as outlined earlier, there is scope to use
ICTs in improving the exchange of information between citizens and law enforcement,
to help build early warning systems, and improve prevention and response.
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7. Other Examples of the Network Shutdown
Debate
It is not unusual and sometimes necessary for a government to implement legislation
that can control communication networks in an emergency. But the law is often
ambiguous and the process or chain of command for a governmental request to be
implemented is often unclear. Security and terrorism are politically sensitive subjects
and it is possible that there may be little political will to consider policy alternatives.
The examples in this section provide brief summary case studies from countries in
which there has been a dialogue between the government and other actors with the
aim of finding alternatives to network disconnection or clarifying laws where needed.
Egypt is a prominent example due to the country-wide shutdown ordered by former
President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, which brought the issue of network shutdowns to
global attention. Northern Ireland, with its history of suffering terrorist attacks, offers
some parallels with Pakistan. The example of Kazakhstan demonstrates that companies
can have a positive impact when entering into dialogue with the government.

7.1 Egypt
The disruption of national mobile and Internet services in Egypt by former President
Hosni Mubarak during the protests of 2011 brought the issue of network shutdowns to
national and international attention. This shutdown was viewed as a desperate attempt
by the Government to retain power. It was ultimately ineffective because it brought
more people onto the streets calling for change and eventually led to the President’s
resignation.
The Egyptian Telecommunication Regulation Law (2003), in particular Article 67 (see
box overleaf) was invoked as justification for the shutdown. That law was originally
intended to address situations such as natural disasters when authorities needed to
control and direct the flow of communication traffic and prioritise emergency service
communication. Article 67 did not contain any provision for blocking communications.
Amendments to this Article were drafted in 2013 and published in Egypt’s National ICT
Strategy (2012-2017)110 but were not implemented, in part due to a second revolution
in 2013 which led to the army ousting the elected President Morsi and installing an
interim government. Nevertheless, a comparison of the original and amended text is
useful.

110
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http://mcit.gov.eg/Upcont/Documents/ICT%20Strategy%202012-2017.pdf
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Comparison of Article 67 text:
Original version:
“The competent state authorities shall have the power to subject to their
administration the telecommunications services and networks of any operator or
service provider, and those working in the operation and maintenance of these
services and networks, in case of natural or environmental disaster or during
periods of declared general mobilization in accordance with the provisions of Law
No. 87 of 1960 concerning these and other cases related to national security.”
Amended version of Article 67
“In the case of a declaration of general mobilization as provided for in Article
65, the Cabinet shall issue a resolution activating the plan referred to in Article
65. The resolution shall define when implementation of the plan is to begin and
the duration of its application. In all cases, it shall be prohibited to disconnect
telecommunications services or to stop their operation entirely or partially,
except in the case that a written decision has been issued by the President of the
Republic following a proposal to do so by the Cabinet.
In this case, the President of the Republic shall, within 15 days of issuing such
a decision, submit a detailed report to the People’s Assembly explaining the
reasons for adoption of the measure. In the event that the People’s Assembly is
not in session, the submission shall be made in the first session held. In all cases,
it shall not be permissible to disrupt or stop relief and emergency services.”

The amended text prohibited network disconnection entirely, except on a written
decision by the President (rather than unspecified “competent authorities”), following
approval by the Cabinet. Following any disconnection, a written report must be
presented to the wider People’s Assembly to explain the decision. While this measure
could add some transparency and accountability to the process, it is not stated clearly
what should be contained in the written report, nor does it specify any limits on the
length of the shutdown or the geographic spread of the area that would be affected.
It also says disruption of emergency services is not permissible, but does not specify
what measures should be taken to ensure that.
In an analysis of the original Telecommunications Law text, ARTICLE 19 and the
Egyptian organization, the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE)
recommended that:
• Cutting off access to the Internet of for an entire population should be abolished
and prohibited;
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• It should be clarified which public authorities are authorised to take control of
communications networks in an emergency.
• Their powers in times of emergency should be, “redefined and limited to the least
restrictive measure required to face genuine perils to national security.”
• “The [Telecommunications] Law should ensure that any disconnection of a specific
service only happens after a prior judicial approval and for limited, specific circumstances allowed under international law”111

7.2 Ireland
In May 2013, the Government of the Republic of Ireland warned that service providers
may be asked to shutdown mobile networks during the G8 Summit to be held in
Northern Ireland the following month.112 Northern Ireland’s police warned that
dissident republicans were “likely” to launch a terrorist attack.113 The summit was
to be held at a golf resort in Fermanagh, a remote part of Northern Ireland and 11
miles north of the border with the Irish Republic. Some 8,000 extra police officers
were reportedly called for duty, making this the biggest police operation in Northern
Ireland’s history.114
Although the G8 summit was to be held in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic’s justice
minister brought in legislation115 to allow Gardaí (the Irish Republic’s police force) to
order telecom companies in the Irish Republic to shut off signals to prevent terrorists
from using mobile phones to detonate bombs. The legislation stated that:
• Only the Minister for Justice and Equality has the power to implement;
• Only a member of the police above a certain rank can request in writing;
• Only in exceptional cases can requests be made orally, as long as it is confirmed in
writing shortly after;
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• Any proposed disruption is subject to strict time limits and must be demonstrated
to be of direct material necessity;
• Ministers can refuse requests.
However, the legislation provided the minister with the right to refuse to disclose
information about the order. For this reason, the lack of transparency, it is difficult
to determine if these powers were actually enforced during the G8 summit. This
highlights the secretive nature of network shutdowns globally, and that even if a
process is in place, politicians may be given the right to refuse to disclose information
about the order, including if it actually happened.
Commenting on the proposed legislation, The Irish Council for Civil Liberties
on the whole approved the legislation, but suggested areas for improvement116:
• The public must have access to emergency services, and network providers must
be obliged to ensure access to continued services;
• In the interest of proportionality, geographical limitations should be explicitly
mentioned;
• The legislation should be subject to review by Parliament.
These comments, combined with those submitted by ARTICLE 19 and AFTE in
Egypt, help to build a common approach to how network shutdowns are requested,
authorised and reviewed, which has helped inform our recommendations on the key
characteristics of a framework around network shutdown (see next section).

7.3 Kazakhstan
In 2011, a peaceful strike by oil workers in the town of Zhanaozen became violent
when police intervened, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. The Government
of Kazakhstan declared a state of emergency and ordered the operator Tele2
Kazakhstan, (majority owned by Swedish telecommunications operator Tele2,) to
suspend services in the city for five days.117 Human rights organisations reported
that they were unable to contact colleagues who were monitoring the situation, and
according to one Human Rights Watch researcher:
“Without a means to communicate with the outside world, people in Zhanaozen are
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extremely vulnerable.”118
Following this incident, Tele2 engaged the Government in dialogue, spoke publicly
about the challenges, and advocated for clearer legal frameworks. The Kazakh
telecommunications law was recently amended to include limiting measures such as
restricting shutdowns to three hours.119
These three examples demonstrate different kinds of engagement with the government
from civil society or an operator on the issue of network shutdowns. Missing are
examples where operators and civil society have joined forces in government
engagement. Also missing are examples where companies offering Internet-based
services such as social networking sites (known as “over the top services) have
publicly entered the debate, as their services are disrupted or inaccessible during
some network shutdowns.
According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, businesses
are advised to conduct stakeholder engagement, designed to build relationships and
mutual understanding between a company and its stakeholders. Often, stakeholder
engagement can be tense and difficult, for example if a mine or oil pipeline is being
built over community land. But in the ICT sector, a different kind of stakeholder
engagement and relationship is emerging. In the case of network disconnection, both
the company, whether an operator or “over the top”, and local civil society have the
same aim: to reduce the frequency of network shutdowns. This alignment of goals has
the potential to produce real and long-lasting action that will ultimately improve the
enjoyment of human rights.
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Conclusion
The spread of the use of ICTs has been rapid because of innovations and decreasing
costs in mobile technology, allowing more remote and rural parts of the world
to connect, in some cases sidestepping landlines altogether. The importance of
communications is recognised internationally as having a profoundly positive effect
on the enjoyment of both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural
rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the
right to education as well as the right to work.120
Network shutdowns are usually justified on security grounds, and the counterargument is often framed around the impact on freedom of expression. However, the
impacts of network shutdowns can have far-reaching, adverse economic and social
implications and could affect future economic growth; furthermore, they can actually
endanger the very right it seeks to preserve, the right to life, by denying users the
ability to connect to family, health and emergency services.
Although the Government of Pakistan faces grave internal threats and serious
security situations, concerns that network shutdowns are becoming the go-to tool
are growing. More effective strategies to prevent attacks are required. Blunt network
shutdowns cannot offer a long-term solution for any country in combatting terrorism
or other security threats. ICTs are used by citizens and terrorists alike, but without
access to ICTs, law enforcement lose the opportunity to use communications for the
purpose of fighting terrorism, and to disseminate important information to move
people to safety, or to calm a concerned population. Advances in technology such as
“crowdsourcing” can help develop early warning systems and cement co-operation
between citizens and law enforcement to create a collective shield against terrorism.
Globally, network shutdowns impacting an entire country are extremely rare. Usually,
smaller geographical areas are targeted, but this could be made up of several cities
simultaneously and reach across many different services.
Telenor Pakistan has demonstrated its willingness to engage with the Government
of Pakistan on the issue of network shutdowns and says it will continue to do so. It
appears that the engagement is having some impact, as the process has become
more streamlined and shutdowns appear to be more targeted. Shutdowns have also
reduced in the past few years.
For example, network shutdowns took place during the Chinese Premier’s visit to
Pakistan in 2013121 but during a visit in 2015, Telenor Pakistan confirmed no
shutdown was implemented. This demonstrates that while the issue is sensitive,
positive change can be achieved by opening a dialogue with governments. However,
while the frequency of mobile shutdowns has been reduced in Pakistan, the scope of

42

120
See UN Resolution A/HRC/20/L.13 The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human
Rights on the Internet, 29 June 2012
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G12/147/10/PDF/G1214710.pdf?OpenElement
Nick Macfie, China’s Li Offers to Help End Pakistan Energy Crisis Reuters, (22nd May 2013)
121
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-pakistan-china-idUSBRE94L06G20130522

shutdowns is increasing to incorporate Internet based messaging services such as
Skype and Whatsapp. Examples from other countries suggest this is a growing trend.
From the survey undertaken for this report during the shutdown of 23 March 2015,
it is clear there is widespread confusion around the issue of network shutdowns in
Pakistan, and a general question about the effectiveness of shutdowns in combating
terrorism. Outside of Pakistan, efforts to engage governments to slow the trend of
network shutdowns have resulted in mixed success. There is not yet a known example
where companies and civil society have joined forces, and there appears to be a
lack of engagement on the part of “over the top” companies, whose services are
also impacted by network disruptions, to publicly enter the debate. On the whole,
confusion reigns around the issue; many countries’ legislation governing network
shutdowns remains vague and related processes lack transparency.
As network shutdowns are a relatively frequent occurrence in Pakistan, and there has
been some engagement between the government and Telenor Pakistan to reduce the
frequency, the analysis of network shutdowns in Pakistan can help inform broader
recommendations for other countries. In the short term, a clearer framework and
process around accountability and transparency of network shutdowns is needed in
many countries. The process for requesting network shutdowns should include the
following key characteristics:
• Network shutdowns should only be invoked in cases of real and imminent threats
to national security or national emergencies, and requests should specify reason
for such disruptions.
• National law should be in place to regulate network shutdowns including which
bodies or agencies are authorised to make requests.
• Shutdown requests should be approved or authorised by the highest level of the
government.
• Clear request processes should be established, with a limited number of actors in
authorised law enforcement agencies allowed to make requests, and designated
individuals within operators to receive such requests.
• All shutdown requests to network operators should be made in writing. The
request should specify the duration and geographical reach of the shutdown
as well as the reason, and demonstrating direct material necessity. Shutdowns
should be limited in duration and geographical area and proportionate to the
perceived level of risk.
• Whenever possible, the public should be informed of network shutdowns, including their duration, geography and services affected.
• All network disruptions should be logged/recorded, and the government should
publish annually a list of all shutdowns.
• Access to and communication with emergency services should be guaranteed to
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the public at all times, including during network shutdowns.
• Legislation concerning network shutdowns should be subject to ongoing review,
including reviews by independent oversight bodies of specific events and
disruptions.
Although governments will be ultimately responsible for implementing legislation,
operators have an important role in minimising the impact of network shutdowns.
However, one company is unlikely to be able to effect widespread change at a local
level and it is important to widen industry support. Telecommunication companies
are finding a voice through membership in global industry initiatives such as the
Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. Other telecommunication operators
worldwide face challenges similar to those of Telenor Pakistan, and this platform
could be used to exchange learning and discuss ways forward, including how to
encourage dialogue between local operators on the ground.
As outlined in Section 7, currently missing are examples where operators and civil
society have joined forces to engage the government. Both can utilise their distinct
skills and leverage to achieve this by joining forces. Greater alignment between
business and civil society has the potential to produce real and long-lasting action
that will ultimately improve the enjoyment of human rights. Civil society groups
could also help operators design a consumer grievance mechanism, to report adverse
impacts experienced during network shutdowns including on health, education and
work. These data could be used to further engage the government.
This research project highlighted many gaps in publicly available information on the
topic of network disconnection as a whole and opportunities for further research, such
as an in-depth analysis of economic impacts of network disruptions as well as impacts
on public health and on safety and security. Lack of accountability and transparency is
a key obstacle to improving the situation and public reporting on network shutdowns
remains in its infancy.
One area where further development is possible is to explore whether companies
could publicly report instances when they have been ordered to wholly or partially
shut down a network, or when they have been asked to block access to a particular
service.
It will be quite some time before governments stop using network shutdowns as a
tool to combat terrorism and ensure public safety, but there are signs of emerging
willingness from governments, business and civil society to search for alternatives
and solutions, so that everyone can consistently enjoy the benefits of ICTs.
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ANNEX A: Timeline of Network Shutdowns
in Pakistan (2012-2015)
Data provided by Bytes for All (2012-2015)122

2012
19th August 2012

21st September 2012

16th November 2012

23rd November 2012

14th August 2012

23rd March 2012

122
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Event
Eid-ul Fitr is a celebration that marks the end
of fasting month Ramadan. The Government
of Pakistan suspended cell phone services
in at least four major cities in the wake of
intelligence reports of possible terror attack
on the day.
Ishq e Rasool, Love for Prophet Muhammad
(PBUH) Day, was observed throughout
Pakistan condemning the film “The Innocence
of Muslims”. At least 20 people were killed
and over 200 wounded in protests across
Pakistan.
First day of Muharram, the first month
of the Islamic calendar. Mobile services
suspended amid fear of possible terror
attacks.
Ashura. The Day of Ashura is on the tenth day
of Muharram in the Islamic calendar and on
that day the martyrdom of Hussain Ibn Ali is
observed. Government bans mobile services
to avoid any act of violence and terrorism
in the country. Government also bans riding
motorcycles.
Independence Day. Security concerns.

Pakistan Day is a national holiday in
Pakistan to commemorate the Lahore
Resolution of 1940. Mobile services were
banned due to potential threats of terrorism
in the country.
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2013

Event

3rd January 2013

Imam Hussain Chelum Chelum day
is observed to mark the 40th day after
martyrdom of Imam Hussain, the grandson of
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Mobile services
blocked due to possible terror attacks.

13th January 2013

Tahir ul Qadri Long March
Pakistani religious scholar and head of
Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) Muhammad
Tahir-ul-Qadri organised a long march to
protest government’s corruption. The march
moved from Lahore to Islamabad and stayed
in Blue Area, Islamabad between 14 and 17
January 2013. Cellular services were blocked
on the route of long march throughout its
way to Islamabad.

23rd March 2013

7th May 2013

23rd May 2013

31st July 2013
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Imran Khan Jalsa A major political party
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf in Lahore carried
out a jalsa [public gathering]. Mobile services
around the venue were blocked due to
possible terror attack.
Ahlesunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) observed
a strike against the ‘Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self Rule Order 2009’. The
decision to suspend cellular services taken as
a precautionary measure to avoid any terror
incident during the day.
Chinese Premier’s visit to Islamabad.
Government suspended cellular services in
Rawalpindi and Islamabad when Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang visited.
Youm e Ali. The martyrdom anniversary
of Hazrat Ali ibn Abi Talib (A.S) is observed
on this day. Government of Pakistan banned
mobile services in few cities in the wake of
terror threats.

2013

Event

14th November 2013

Ashura. The Day of Ashura is on the tenth
day of Muharram in the Islamic calendar and
the martyrdom of Hussain Ibn Ali is observed.
Government ban mobile services to avoid any
act of violence and terrorism in the country.

24th November 2013

Ashura

24th December 2013

Chelum of Imam Hussain is observed to
mark the 40th day after martyrdom of Imam
Hussein (PBUH), the grandson of Prophet
Muhammad (PBUH). Government banned
mobile services in various parts of country
due to possible terror threat.
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2014

Event

14th January 2014

Eid Milad un Nabi is the observed on
12th day of Rabi’ al-awwal to mark birth of
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Government
banned cellular services in different parts of
the country due to security threats.

23rd June 2014

Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri [Chairman of Pakistan
Awami Tehreek (PAT)] was flying in from
Dubai to Rawalpindi. Initially some areas if
Rawalpindi were blocked and then, when his
plane was diverted to Lahore, the area from
Lahore airport to his residence were blocked.

20th July 2014

8th - 14th August 2014

23rd - 27th August 2014

Youm-E-Ali The martyrdom anniversary of
Hazrat Ali ibn Abi Talib (A.S) is observed on
this day. Government banned mobile services
in few cities in the wake of terror threats.
Inqilaab MarchInqilaab March was an
ongoing public protest throughout August,
organised by the political party Pakistan
Awami Tehreek (PAT). The protesters demand
the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif.
As above.
Shutdown due to security reasons.

3rd - 4th November 2014
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Ashura. The Day of Ashura is on the tenth
day of Muharram in the Islamic calendar and
marks a very important day as martyrdom of
Hussain Ibn Ali is observed. Government ban
mobile services to avoid any act of violence
and terrorism in the country.

2015
23rd March 2015

14th August 2015

Event
Pakistan Day Parade

Independence Day
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